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STUDENT NOTES
erroneously granted to the husband and the wife's estate was not suffi-
cient for her support.2 RAMON A. WOODALL, JR.
NEGLIGENCE AS CONDUCT
The present discussion is meant to be a treatment of the subject
of negligence-a type of conduct giving rise sometimes to civil liabil-
ity, sometimes to criminal liability,' sometimes to both. There is sub-
stantial authority for the position that criminal negligence differs from
civil only in degree and not in kind.2 'Due to the fact that negligence
on the civil side of the docket has received more attention from out-
standing legal minds than has that in the field of criminal law, material
gleaned predominantly from discussions of civil negligence will be
used. It is submitted that the standard for evaluating negligent con-
duct as discussed in this note is applicable both to civil and to criminal
cases; that "reckless disregard" corresponds to "gross negligence",'
that type of misconduct upon which convictions of involuntary man-
slaughter are based.'
According to the Restatement of the Law of Tortsr "negligence is
any conduct, except conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of
others, which falls below the standard established by law for the pro-
tection of others against unreasonable risk of harm." It will be seen
" Gaines v. Gaines, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 471, 19 S.W. 929 (1892); Hoover
v. Hoover, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 680, 21 S.W. 234 (1893); Tilton v. Tilton, 16
Ky. L. Rep. 538, 29 S.W. 290 (1895); Thompson v. Thompson, 27 Ky.
L. Rep. 516, S5 S.W. 730 (1905); Caudill v. Caudill, 172 Ky. 460, 189
S.W. 431 (1916); Burton v. Burton, 184 Ky. 268, 211 S.W. 869 (1919).
'Clark and Marshall, Crimes (3d ed. 1927) 79, sec. 51; id. at 246,
sec. 204; May, Criminal Law (4th ed. 1938) 260, sec. 159; Davis, The
Development of Negligence as a Basis for Liability in Criminal Horai-
cide Cases, 26 Ky. L. J. 209 (1938).
2 "This last is really, to my mind, what a crime is. It is a for-
bidden act in which society as a whole has a peculiar interest, and in
the prevention of which it is particularly concerned. It is this
concern which brings the state as a juristic person into the matter as a
party plaintiff, and, to my mind, it is this procedural matter which is
the distinction between a crime and a tort." Levitt, Extent and
Function of the Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17 Ill. L.R. 578, 583 (1923);
11... criminal negligence-is largely a matter of degree . . .", State
v. Lester, 127 Minn. 282, 149 N.W. 297, 298 (1914); "If he knows or
reasonably should know his act tends to endanger life, and that the
death of a human being is not 'improbable' as a result thereof, it is
sufficient to sustain a conviction of manslaughter by culpable negli-
gence." State v. Studebaker, - Mo, -, 66 S.W. (2d) 877, 881 (1933).
3 Cannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214, 107 So. 360, 363 (1926). Compare
also the quotation from State v. Studebaker, supra note 2, with the
Restatement definition of Reckless disregard, infra note 5. And see
Restatement of Torts, sec. 282, comment d, special note: 5.
'People v. Adams, 289 Ill. 339, 124 N.E. 575 (1919); State v. Blaine,
104 N.J. Law 325, 140 Atl. 566 (1928); Rex v. Greisman, 4 D.L.R.
738 (Ont. 1926); Clark and Marshall, op. cit, supra note 1, at 330,
sec. 264a; Wharton on Homicide (3d ed. 1907) 681.
Sec. 282.
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that this definition excludes from negligence "conduct recklessly dis-
regardful of an interest of others," such conduct being treated in a
separate chapter.'
Beginning with the proposition that negligence is conduct creating
an unreasonable risk of harm (and actually materializing in harm) ,
some discussion of the standard applied in determining what consti-
tutes an unreasonable risk is necessary. An attempt should be made
to indicate the basis upon which reckless disregard was treated sepa-
rately in the Restatement.
Reckless disregard consists of an "unreasonable risk of bodily
harm" plus a "high degree of probability that substantial harm will
result."' (Italics supplied.) It is stated that the difference is "in the
degree of the risk" but that it amounts "substantially to a difference in
kind."' Since it is said that reckless misconduct differs materially
from intentional misconduct,1 0 and that for reckless misconduct it is
not necessary that the actor himself realize its dangerousness,u it
would seem that negligence and reckless disregard may be treated
together, insofar as the standard whereby unreasonable conduct is
evaluated is concerned."
As regards any behavior, there are two methods of evaluation;
6 Chap. 19, "Reckless Disregard of Safety", secs. 500-503. Sec. 500
of the Restatement defines reckless disregard as follows: "The actor's
conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he inten-
tionally does an act or fails to do an act which it is his duty to the
other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would
lead a reasonable man to realize that the actor's conduct not only
creates an unresonable risk of bodily harm to the other but also
involves a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result
to him."
7 There can be no negligence in the air; nor can conduct be action-
able until it invades some interest which the law protects, Pollock,
Torts (12th ed. 1923) 463; "Negligence is not a tort unless it results
in the commission of a wrong. . . ." Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co.,
248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 101 (1928).
8Restatement of Torts, sec. 500.
9Ibid., comment g. Apparently, however, both are determined
by the same yardstick, the ordinary prudent man, with negligence
measuring (say) up to 60cm. of undesirable conduct, and reckless dis-
regard 60 cm. and above. See Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52
Harv. L.R. 905, 914 (1939).
"That is, in reckless behavior, the actor "does not intend to
cause the harm which results." Restatement of Torts, sec. 500, com-
ment f.
n "In order that the actor's conduct may be reckless, it is not
necessary that he himself recognize it as being extremely dangerous."
Restatement of Torts, sec. 500, comment c.
12 In other words, since it is the degree of risk ("in excess of that
necessary to make the conduct-negligent"; "an easily perceptible
danger") plus the danger threatened ("substantial bodily harm or
death") that marks the difference, the same standard, the "ordinary
prudent man under the circumstances" is the standard to be employed
by the court. The only other apparent .difference material to this note
has to do with the defense of contributory negligence. See Restate-
ment of Torts, sec. 282, comment d, special note; ibid., sec. 482.
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first, in terms of what the actor saw, thought, and did, and second,
what a reasonable man in the actor's position would have seen and
done. The former is a subjective evaluation, the latter, an objective
one. According to the Restatement," "Unless the actor is a child or
an insane person, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to
avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man under like circum-
stances."" The standard of the reasonable man has been variously
described and discussed.5 By whatever name it is presented, the same
idea is sought to be expressed, namely, that the actor's conduct at the
time of causing the injury must not have been different from that of
the man of ordinary prudence. When it is asked whether a defendant
was exercising "such care, prudence, and forethought"'0 as would have
characterized the behavior of a reasonable man, it is meant merely to
be inquired whether his conduct was as safe as that of a reasonable
man exercising such qualities would have been."
As regards the phrase "under like circumstances" included in the
standard, the question is presented as to whether individual character-
istics of the actor may be taken into consideration. s The early writers
apparently thought that the law considered several personal elements, "
including the state of mind of the actor? However, it is commonly
accepted now that negligence is conduct evaluated without reference
to the state of mind of the actor." In other words, even though the
Sec. 283.
"Ibid., comment a, states that the words "reasonable man" "denote
a person exercising those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelli-
gence, and judgment which society requires of its members for the
protection of their own interests and the interests of others."
',Pollock defines the standard as "the foresight and caution of a
prudent man-the average prudent man." Torts (12th ed. 1923) 444;
Harper, Torts (1933) 159 as the "ordinary reasonably prudent man"
which he says is "a pure fiction"; in Lundy v. Tel. Co., 90 S.C. 25, 72
S.E. 558, 564 (1911), it is "a person of ordinary intelligence and pru-
dence"; in Arkansas and La. R.R. v. Sanders, 81 Ark. 604, 99 S.W.
1109 (1907), a "reasonably prudent man"; in Keith v. Worcester and
Blackstone St. Ry., 196 Mass. 478, 82 N.E. 680 (1907), a man "reasonably
prudent and careful"; in Davis v. Concord and Montreal R.R., 68 N.H.
247, 44 Atl. 388 (1895), a "person of average prudence".18Thompson, Negligence (2d ed. 1901) 3.
'See Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence, and Indifference, 39
Harv. L.R. 849 (1926), at pp. 866 ff.
"To the extent that such characteristics influence the determina-
tion of negligence and its penalty, the standard will be subjective.
""In other words, every person must use that degree of care
which prudent persons of his class, taking all circumstances into
account, including health, strength, and habits of body and mind,
would use, when acting prudently." Shearman and Redfield, Negli-
gence (5th ed. 1898) 130.
" "Negligence-consists in a certain mental attitude of the
defendant towards the consequences of his act." Salmond, Torts (5th
ed. 1919) 21.
""Negligence may be due-for example-to a lack of common
knowledge, memory, observation, imagination, foresight, intelligence,
judgment, quickness of reaction, deliberation, coolness, self-control,
determination, courage, or altruism. Few negligence cases show clearly
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actor has a particular combination of mental traits and capacities, an
individual set of habit formations, reactions and thought processes
peculiar to himself, they are not such circumstances as the law con-
siders in determining whether his conduct was, under the circum,
stances, reasonably safe.Y With respect to physical characteristics
the rule is otherwise. If the actor was physically defective, the
reasonable man assumes the same infirmity.'
According to Terryi the circumstances to be considered in deter-
mining the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the conduct may
include five factors: (1) the magnitude of the risk; (2) the value or
importance of that which is exposed to the risk; (3) the collateral
object and its importance; (4) the utility of the risk; and (5) the
necessity of the risk. Such a standard obviously leaves no room for
subjective considerations, and it would be wholly with reference to the
evaluation which a man of common experience would place upon each
of the above factors present that the court would deal.
Keeping in mind the factors above set out, suppose that A, while
on a camping trip threw out into a field a quantity of flour mixed with
arsenic, which had been used to poison rats. One of Farmer Jones'
prize herefords ate enough of the mixture to cause its death. Under
-because it is immaterial (italics added)-what mental shortcoming
produced the negligent act in question. But in some cases it is quite
apparent that it was not indifference or inadvertence but ignorance,
stupidity, bad judgment, timidity, excitability, or forgetfulness."
Edgerton, supra note 17 at 856-7; "The extent to which the negligent
act obviously imperils the life of another measures the state of mind
of the doer in legal contemplation and therefore his criminality."
State v. Studebaker, - Mo. -, 66 S.W. (2d) 877, 881 (1933).
2As expressed by Terry, Negligence, 29 Harv. L.R. 40, 47 (1915),
"Every man, whether he is a standard man or not, is required to act
as a standard man would. If by chance he is not such a man, he may
... make a mistake and act so as to be guilty of legal negligence,
though he has used all such care and forethought as he was capable of."
Holmes observed that "The law takes no account of the infinite varieties
of temperament, intellect, and education which make the internal char-
acter of a given act so different in different men. It does not attempt
to see men as God sees them, for more than one sufficient reason...
If, for instance, a man is born hasty and awkward, is always having
accidents and hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt his con-
genital defects will be allowed for in the courts of Heaven, but his
slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors than if they sprang
from guilty neglect. His neighbors accordingly require him at his
proper peril, to come up to their standard, and the courts which they
establish decline to take his personal equation into account." Holmes,
The Common Law (1881) 108.
Seavey, 2egligence-Subjective or Objective, 41 Harv. L.R. 1, 13
(1927). The reason for the rule is sound: good sense does not require
that a person, in order to escape liability for negligence, do that which
it would be physically impossible for him to do. This is not saying,
however, that the defective person is not held to an exercise of greater
caution than one without the defects. The care that a reasonably
prudent man would exercise under the circumstances (knowing of the
defect, if the actor had reason to know of it) is required.
14 Supra note 22, at 42-3.
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the circumstances, a reasonable man exercising ordinary prudence
would have realized the risk of poisoning some livestock. A's col-
lateral object was to rid himself of the mixture which was no longer
of any use and which it might be dangerous to keep around. There
was therefore some utility in discarding the material, but the necessity
for throwing it into the field, in view of the comparative ease with
which it could have been disposed of by burying, burning, or otherwise,
was small. A's conduct, then, being more dangerous than that of a
man of ordinary prudence in such a situation, it matters not whether
he was purely inadvertent (did not realize that his act was creating
any risk), lacking in judgment (considered his conduct and its pos-
sible consequences, and mistakenly concluded that it created no
unreasonable risk), or recklessly disregardful (recognizing that his
conduct was dangerous, nevertheless persisted, either not caring
whether he caused injury, or for some other reason preferring to take
the risk rather than desist).
In connection with the question of reckless disregard, suppose that
A were driving through town at the rate of 50 miles per hour at eleven
o'clock p.m. At that hour there is still some traffic and a few pedes-
trians. The deceased drove out of a side street without looking" and
was struck by A and killed. The jury finds that driving at 50 miles
per hour through town at 11:00 p.m. creates a situation from which
there is a substantial probability of death. A wishes to show three
things which influenced his behavior: (1) he had just had a violent
quarrel with his wife and was so emotionally upset that he did not
realize his speed or the risk involved; (2) his sixteen-year-old daughter
was at the depot to catch the train and elope, and A was in a hurry
to get there before the train left; and (3) A had a terrible toothache
and had taken a few drinks to ease the pain. The question is whether
A may introduce to the jury evidence to establish these three sets of
facts and whether they are to be considered "under the circumstances"
as set out in the instructions. It is submitted that the phrase "under
the circumstances" does not include facts 1 and 3, but that fact 2 may
be shown as bearing upon whether there was any utility in A's act to
weigh against the risk which the act created. Assuming that the jury
found that A's conduct under the circumstances amounted to a reckless
disregard of safety, or "gross negligence", A would be criminally
liable for manslaughter in addition to being civilly liable for damages.
However, were the jury allowed to consider A's quarrel with his wife,
and the throbbing molar, they might conclude that in a similar situa-
tion "the man of ordinary prudence" might behave in much the same
fashion. Submission of these subjective elements would materially
lessen the likelihood of A's having to answer for his admittely socially
undesirable conduct.
2 Contributory negligence is no defense in an action for damages
resulting from reckless disregard, Restatement of ToXts, sec. 482; nor
in a criminal action, Clark and Marshall, op. cit. supra, note 1, at
"Clark and Marshall, op. cit. supra note 1.
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The superiority of the objective theory of negligence comes from
the greater protection which it affords society against harmful conduct
resulting from deficiencies in knowledge, memory, observation, self-
control, and the like. As Holmes expressed it, "when men live in
society, a certain average of conduct, a sacrifice of individual peculiari-
ties going beyond a certain point, is necessary to the general welfare."'1
For the protection of the group, the individual must conform to
acceptable modes of behavior. Since it can seldom be ascertained
whether a particular act will or will not result in injury, the general
types of behavior frequently causing injury (if their utility does not
justify the risk) are to be discouraged. The failure of an individual
to live among his fellows without subjecting them to undue risks Is
not to be condoned because he is anxious and solicitious for their well-
being. What the law has regard for is the general security, and it
imposes a standard to maintain that security. When the individual
acts, he must measure up to that standard at his peril of answering
for injurious consequences.
The idea that negligence is or involves a state of mind has been
quite generally abandoned. By predicating liability solely upon unde-
sirable consequences of dangerous conduct, the law discourages such
conduct, and thereby protects the general security. By punishing for
conduct causing harm because under like circumstances a reasonably
prudent man would not have engaged in such conduct, the law will
give protection to society against those individuals whose protestations
of pure intentions always accompany their undesirable behavior.
Despite the lack of uniformity among the writers as to what may
be considered by the jury "under the circumstances" of the particular
case, it is probably safe to say that outstanding physical defects, the
effects of which can be estimated in light of the experience of a jury,
and not merely speculated upon, are valid considerations. Insofar as
the effects of age, poor sense-perception, slowness of reaction, and the
like, are matters of conjecture for jurors, they are better left to be
"allowed for in the courts of Heaven" on the theory that a sacrifice of
individual interests is justified in the interests of society. "Men
must be able to assume that when their fellow men act affirmatively,
their action will be resonably safe, that is, will create no greater
risk of harm than the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the
community permits."'  MARnVIN M. TiNcEam
THE LIMITS OF OBJECTIVITY IN NEGLIGENCE
It is the purpose of this note to discuss the methods and standards
used by courts to determine whether an actor's conduct Involved
negligence toward a plaintiff injured thereby. The writer will show
first, what factors are essential for negligence to exist; second, assum-
ing every individual's conduct is measured by that degree of care which
" Holmes, op. cit. supra note 22.
8 Edgerton, supra note 17, at 868.
